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The	 past	 20	 years	 has	 been	 a	 period	 of	 rapid	 growth	 in	 emerging	 economies,	 leading	 to	convergence	in	income	and	productivity	levels.	Less	is	known	about	the	industry	origins	of	this	development,	 a	 gap	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 fill.	 For	 30	 industries	 in	 40	 economies,	 I	 estimate	industry	 relative	 productivity	 levels	 for	 the	 period	 1995-2011.	 The	 results	 show	 that	convergence	was	concentrated	in	manufacturing.	An	analysis	of	potential	productivity	drivers	shows	that	much	less	is	known	about	what	is	behind	the	observed	industry	convergence.	 	
                                                1	This	material	has	been	published	in	The	World	Economy:	Growth	or	Stagnation?	Edited	by	Dale	W.	Jorgenson,	Kyoji	Fukao	and	Marcel	Timmer	and	published	by	the	Cambridge	University	Press.	 	This	version	is	free	to	view	and	 download	 for	 personal	 use	 only.	Not	 for	 re-distribution,	 re-sale	 or	 use	 in	 derivative	works.	©	Cambridge	
University	Press.	
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Introduction While	 the	 recent	 work	 of	 Piketty	 (2014)	 and	 others	 has	 drawn	 great	 attention	 to	 rising	inequality	of	income	levels	and	wealth	within	many	countries,	the	rapid	growth	of	emerging	economies,	 such	 as	 China	 and	 India,	 has	 led	 to	 a	 decline	 in	 global	 interpersonal	 income	inequality	(Milanovic,	2013).	Even	by	the	exacting	standard	of	Pritchett	(1997)	–	the	ratio	of	GDP	per	capita	in	the	US	relative	to	the	country	with	the	lowest	level	of	GDP	per	capita	–	the	Great	Divergence	that	had	been	ongoing	since	1870,	seems	to	have	ended	around	the	year	2000.	This	change	in	the	evolution	of	world	income	distribution	calls	for	an	explanation.	One	area	of	the	literature	has	focused	on	the	role	of	industry	productivity	in	shaping	cross-country	income	differences,	 the	 importance	 of	 structural	 change	 for	 aggregate	 outcomes,	 and	 identifying	drivers	of	industry	productivity	growth	and	whether	these	have	a	different	impact	depending	on	the	level	of	technological	sophistication.2		
The	contribution	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	provide	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	 the	 industry	sources	 of	 aggregate	 convergence.	 The	 current	 literature	 in	 this	 area	 either	 gives	 a	comprehensive	 coverage	 of	 industries,	 but	 only	 for	OECD	 countries.	 This	 begs	 the	 question	whether	 rich-country	 results	 are	 applicable	 to	 emerging	 economies	 as	 well.	 Alternatively,	studies	covers	a	wide	range	of	countries	but	only	for	a	specific	sector	of	the	economy,	such	as	agriculture	or	manufacturing.3	This	begs	the	question	whether	a	specific	sector	truly	plays	an	
                                                2	See	e.g.	Restuccia,	Yang	and	Zhu	(2008),	Vollrath	(2009),	Herrendorf	and	Valentinyi	(2012),	Lagakos	and	Waugh	(2013)	and	Gollin,	Lagakos	and	Waugh	(2014)	on	industry	productivity	differences;	on	structural	change,	see	e.g.	Duarte	and	Restuccia	(2010),	McMillan	and	Rodrik	(2011)	and	Herrendorf,	Rogerson	and	Valentinyi	(2014)	and	on	the	moderating	role	of	technological	sophistication,	see	the	survey	of	Aghion,	Akcigit	and	Howitt	(2014).	
3	See	e.g.	Bernard	and	Jones	(1996),	 Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2009)	and	van	Biesebroeck	(2009)	on	industry-level	convergence	across	OECD	countries.	See	e.g.	Restuccia,	Yang	and	Zhu	(2008),	Vollrath	(2009)	and	Gollin,	Lagakos	and	Waugh	(2014)	on	the	role	of	agricultural	productivity	and	see	Rodrik	(2013)	on	manufacturing.	
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exceptional	 role	 in	 explaining	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 economic	 performance.	 These	shortcomings	 are	 remedied	 in	 this	 paper	 by	 covering	 40	 economies	 at	 a	 wide	 range	 of	development	levels	and	30	industries	making	up	the	entire	(market)	economy.4	
In	the	analysis	in	this	paper,	I	will	first	determine	the	importance	of	specific	sectors	and	the	role	of	 structural	 change	 in	 accounting	 for	 the	 observed	 convergence	 of	 aggregate	 productivity.	Second,	I	look	at	a	range	of	variables	that	have	been	suggested	to	influence	productivity	growth	and	(in	some	cases)	to	do	so	differently	depending	on	the	industry’s	distance	to	the	technology	frontier.	The	variables	considered	are	human	capital,	research	and	development,	(high-tech)	imports,	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	and	competition.5	If	a	particular	variable	has	a	larger	positive	effect	on	productivity	growth	in	industries	that	are	more	distant	from	the	technology	frontier,	it	may	help	explain	convergence.	
To	estimate	relative	productivity	 levels,	 I	estimate	prices	of	 industry	output	and	inputs.	The	data	used	are	comparable	to	those	used	in	the	most	recent	version	of	the	Penn	World	Table	(see	Feenstra,	 Inklaar	and	Timmer,	2015),	drawing	on	detailed	surveys	of	 final	consumption	and	investment	prices6	and	estimates	of	relative	export	and	import	prices	by	Feenstra	and	Romalis	(2014).	Information	on	the	input-output	structure	and	prices	of	labour	and	capital	are	based	on	the	World	Input-Output	Database	(WIOD,	Timmer	2012).	
                                                4	Excluded	are	industries	for	which	the	relative	output	level	cannot	be	determined	separately	from	relative	input	levels,	namely	government,	health,	education	and	real	estate.	
5 	On	 human	 capital,	 see	 Vandenbussche,	 Aghion	 and	 Meghir	 (2006)	 and	 Ang,	 Madsen	 and	 Islam	 (2011);	 on	research	and	development,	see	Griffith,	Redding	and	Van	Reenen	(2004);	on	imports	see	Cameron,	Redding	and	Proudman	(2005)	and	Keller	(2004);	on	FDI,	see	Alfaro,	Chanda,	Kalemli-Ozcan	and	Sayek	(2010),	Bloom,	Sadun	and	van	Reenen	(2012)	and	Cipollina,	Giovannetti,	Pietrovit	and	Pozzolo	(2012);	and	on	competition,	see	Griffith,	Harrison	and	Simpson	(2010).	
6	See	e.g.	World	Bank	(2008).	
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The	resulting	productivity	estimates	show	that	economy-wide	productivity	levels	have	moved	substantially	closer	together	between	1995	and	2011,	helped	by	rapid	productivity	growth	in	countries	like	China,	India,	Russia	and	formerly	Communist	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Of	the	major	sectors	of	the	economy,	only	productivity	levels	in	manufacturing	have	moved	substantially	closer	together	while	in	agriculture,	services	and	other	goods	production	the	dispersion	of	productivity	levels	has	changed	only	little.	Agriculture	did	contribute	more	substantially	 to	 aggregate	 convergence	by	 shrinking	 in	 size,	with	 its	 average	 share	 in	 value	added	almost	halving	over	the	period	and	declining	most	strongly	in	countries	with	low	levels	of	agricultural	productivity.	This	points	to	the	importance	of	agriculture’s	low	productivity	and	high	 employment	 share	 in	 explaining	 cross-country	 income	 differences.7	Overall,	 structural	change	has	contributed	about	one-fifth	of	total	convergence.	
To	 analyse	 potential	 drivers	 of	 observed	 industry	 convergence,	 I	 construct	 multifactor	productivity	growth	rates	using	data	from	the	Socio-Economic	Accounts	(SEA)	of	WIOD.	These	are	KLEMS-type	productivity	growth	rates,	except	that	the	changing	composition	of	the	capital	stock	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 account.	 In	 regression	 analysis	 including	 a	 range	 of	 productivity-influencing	 variables,	 I	 show	 that	 higher	 spending	 on	 R&D,	 more	 imports	 of	 high-tech	intermediate	 inputs,	 and	more	 inward	 FDI	 are	 associated	 with	 faster	 productivity	 growth.	However,	 none	 of	 these	 (or	 any	 other)	 effects	 vary	 systematically	 with	 proximity	 to	 the	technological	frontier.	These	results	are	robust	to	measurement	error	in	industry	productivity	levels	 and	 robust	 across	major	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy.	 So	while	we	 observe	 that	 industry	productivity	 is	 converging	 across	 countries,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 clear	 understanding	 why	convergence	is	taking	place	and	why	in	some	industries	and	countries	and	not	in	others.	
                                                7	As	emphasized	in	Caselli	(2005),	Restuccia	et	al.	(2008),	Herrendorf	et	al.	(2014),	Lagakos	and	Waugh	(2013)	and	Gollin,	Lagakos	and	Waugh	(2014).	
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It	should	be	noted	that	the	broad	country	coverage	of	the	analysis	in	this	paper	comes	at	clear	cost	in	terms	of	measurement	quality.	First,	the	comparison	of	industry	output	prices	cannot	be	of	as	high	a	quality	as	in	Jorgenson,	Nomura	and	Samuels	(2015),	who	rely	on	more	extensive	and	more	 price	 comparisons.	 More	 in	 general,	 the	 data	 required	 to	 compare	 prices	 across	countries	is	much	less	extensive	than	for	comparing	prices	over	time,	while	at	the	same	time	cross-country	price	differences	tend	to	be	much	larger.	Second,	unlike	in	the	standard	KLEMS	methodology,	information	about	the	asset	composition	of	industry	capital	inputs	could	not	be	taken	 into	 account.	 As	 discussed	 in	 OECD	 (2009),	 this	 is	 a	 crucial	 element	 in	 measuring	productive	 capital	 inputs.	 Taken	 together,	 this	 implies	 that	 the	 resulting	 estimates	 of,	 in	particular,	comparative	productivity	levels	should	be	considered	as	experimental,	rather	than	definitive.	The	methodological	issues	mentioned	here	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	 in	the	next	 section.	 In	 discussing	 the	 results	 and	 drawing	 conclusions,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	measurement	 shortcomings	 likely	 lead	 me	 to	 overestimate	 the	 degree	 of	 productivity	convergence,	while	the	regression-based	analysis	is	likely	to	mostly	unaffected.	
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper,	 I	will	 first	 lay	 out	 the	methodology	 for	measuring	 industry	productivity	levels	and	growth,	followed	by	a	description	of	the	data	and	the	results	from	the	analysis.	Following	the	results,	I	discuss	where	evidence	on	the	sources	of	industry	convergence	might	be	found	and	some	conclusions.	
Methodology The	crucial	input	for	the	analysis	of	convergence	is	a	set	of	industry	productivity	level	estimates,	so	 this	 section	 is	 mostly	 devoted	 to	 detailing	 the	 estimation	 of	 industry	 and	 aggregate	productivity.	A	more	detailed	exposition	of	the	underlying	production	theory	is	given	in	Inklaar	and	Diewert	(2015).	For	comparing	industry	productivity	across	countries	and	time,	consider	an	 industry	 production	 function	 with	 outcomes	 for	 country	 c	 at	 time	 t	 (omitting	 industry	subscripts	for	simplicity):	
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(1) Yct = F Xcjt ,Act( ) ,	where	 industry	 output	 Y	 is	 produced	 using	 inputs	 	and	 productivity	 level	 A.	 The	production	function	is	assumed	to	be	identical	across	countries,	but	following	Caves	et	al.	(CCD,	1982a)	I	assume	a	translog	form	to	allow	for	a	substantial	degree	of	flexibility.	Assuming	perfect	competition	in	factor	and	output	markets	and	constant	returns	to	scale,	CCD	show	that	relative	productivity	across	countries	can	be	computed	as:	
(2) !ln Act( )− ln A( ) = ln Yct( )− ln Y( )− 12 v jct − v j( ) ln X jct( )− ln X j( )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥j=1J∑ ,	where	an	upper	bar	indicates	the	arithmetic	mean	over	the	set	of	countries	and	years	and	!v jct 	is	the	share	in	total	costs	of	input	j	in	country	c	at	time	t.	Note	that	this	definition	of	relative	productivity	levels	is	specifically	tailored	to	a	multi-country	setting	where	an	important	aim	is	
that	the	comparison	should	be	transitive,	 i.e.	 	for	any	set	of	countries	c,	m	and	k.	
Following	 CCD,	 this	 is	 achieved	 by	 comparing	 every	 country	 to	 a	 (hypothetical)	 average	country.	Furthermore,	 to	enable	a	comparison	of	productivity	 levels	across	countries	and	at	different	points	in	time,	the	average	of	output	levels,	input	levels	and	cost	shares	is	computed	over	the	countries	and	year.	The	approach	of	comparing	a	relative	output	to	a	relative	input	level	is	relevant	more	generally	and	is	implemented	also	in	Jorgenson,	Nomura	and	Samuels	(2015).	Their	comparison	is	bilateral,	between	Japan	and	the	United	States,	which	allows	them	to	achieve	a	level	of	industry	and	input	detail	that	cannot	be	achieved	in	the	40-country	setting	of	this	paper,	but	theirs	is	another	example	of	industry	productivity	comparisons	based	on	a	translog	 production	 function.	 I	 will	 discuss	 the	 approach	 to	 implementing	 equation	 (2)	 –	measuring	relative	industry	output	and	input	levels	–	in	some	more	detail	before	turning	to	the	data	and	results.	








(3)	 ln Yct( )− ln Y( ) = ln VctY( )− ln VY( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − ln PctY( )− ln PY( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ 	
Equation	(3)	expresses	the	quantity	of	output	in	country	c	(for	a	given	industry	at	a	given	point	in	time)	as	the	ratio	of	the	value	of	output	VctY 	and	the	relative	price	PctY .	This	relative	price	is	commonly	referred	to	as	a	purchasing	power	parity	(PPP)	and	it	serves	the	same	purpose	as	a	producer	price	index	for	comparing	the	quantity	of	output	of	an	industry	over	time.	
Ideally,	 these	PPPs	would	be	based	on	producer	price	data,	but	the	lack	of	dedicated	survey	data	means	that	alternative	approaches	have	been	followed	in	the	literature.	When	focused	only	on	manufacturing,	some	have	opted	to	use	exchange	rates	to	compare	output	from	different	countries,	assuming	a	relative	price	of	one	(e.g.	Rodrik,	2013).	An	argument	in	favour	of	this	approach	 is	 that	 many	 manufactured	 products	 are	 traded	 and	 thus	 more	 exposed	 to	 the	pressures	of	the	Law	of	One	Price	(LOP).	But	this	argument	is	not	fully	convincing	given	the	systematic	deviations	from	LOP	even	for	products	that	are	internationally	traded	(Feenstra	and	Romalis,	2014;	Burstein	and	Gopinath,	2014)	and	the	very	limited	trade	in	some	manufactured	products,	such	as	ready-mixed	concrete	(Syverson,	2008).	
The	main	alternative	approach,	that	can	also	be	applied	outside	manufacturing,	is	to	use	relative	prices	collected	as	part	of	the	International	Comparison	Program	(ICP).	These	prices	form	the	basis	of	the	GDP	PPPs	disseminated	by	the	World	Bank	(2008,	2014)	and	are	based	on	prices	of	consumption	and	investment	goods	and	services.	Relative	output	prices	at	the	industry	level	are	estimated	by	selecting	and	combining	the	prices	of	goods	that	are	produced	by	each,	as	in	Sørensen	 and	 Schjerning	 (2008),	 van	 Biesebroeck	 (2009)	 and	 Herrendorf	 and	 Valentinyi	
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(2012).	 Given	 its	 broad	 application,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 standard	 approach,	 yet	 it	 has	drawbacks	as	well.	For	one,	the	prices	of	goods	consumed	or	invested	domestically	do	not	take	into	account	the	prices	of	exported	products	while	they	are	influenced	by	the	prices	of	imported	goods.	 Furthermore,	 final	 consumption	 and	 investment	 prices	 are	 not	 well-suited	 for	comparing	prices	of	industries	that	produce	mostly	intermediate	inputs.		
The	most	thorough	recent	approach	to	resolving	these	challenges	is	discussed	in	Jorgenson,	et	al.	(2015).	They	compare	prices	and	productivity	between	Japan	and	the	US	and	their	estimates	of	 relative	 output	 prices	 rely	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 sources,	 including	 a	 dedicated	 survey	 of	intermediate	input	prices.8	Most	of	this	information	is	not	available	for	the	broader	range	of	countries	covered	in	this	analysis,	so	I	have	to	rely	on	ICP	prices	and	relative	prices	of	exports	and	imports.	This	still	constitutes	an	improvement	over	most	studies	on	industry	productivity	that	only	use	ICP	prices,	but	is	some	distance	removed	from	the	Jorgenson	et	al.	(2015)	‘gold	standard’.	The	possible	empirical	implications	of	this	will	be	discussed	later.	
I	take	the	following	approach	to	estimating	industry	output	prices:9	
(4)	 ln Pct
Y( )− ln PY( ) = 12 rctQ + rctZ + r Q + r Z( ) ln PctQ( )− ln PQ( )( )
+ 12 rctX + r X( ) ln PctX( )− ln PX( )( )
− 12 rctM + r M( ) ln PctM( )− ln PM( )( )
,	
where	Q	refers	to	goods	for	domestic	final	consumption	and	investment,	Z	refers	to	goods	for	domestic	intermediate	consumption,	X	to	exports,	M	to	imports,	and	 	refers	to	the	share	of	goods	category	k	in	the	value	of	industry	output,	 .	The	 ’s	sum	to	one,	satisfying	
                                                8	See	Nomura	and	Miyagawa	(2015)	for	details.	
9	Except	for	the	output	price	of	agriculture,	for	which	direct	output	price	data	is	available,	see	the	data	section	for	more	details.	
rk
rck =Vck VcY rk
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the	equality	between	the	value	of	products	supplied	–	through	production	or	imports	–	and	the	value	of	products	used	–	 through	(intermediate	or	 final)	consumption	and	 investment.	Note	that	 only	 prices	 for	 final	 consumption	 and	 investment	 are	 available,	 necessitating	 the	assumption	 that	 prices	 of	 products	 for	 intermediate	 consumption	 equal	 prices	 for	 final	consumption.	Despite	this	simplifying	assumption,	equation	(4)	represents	an	important	step	forward	by	not	having	to	assume	that	prices	of	exported	and	imported	products	equal	the	prices	of	final	consumption	and	investment.	
Industry	inputs	Gross	 output	 of	 an	 industry	 is	 produced	 using	 factor	 inputs	 –	 capital	 and	 labour	 –	 and	intermediate	inputs.	Following	equation	(3)	for	the	relative	quantity	of	output,	the	value	of	each	input	is	combined	with	estimates	of	relative	input	prices.	In	the	case	of	domestically	produced	intermediate	inputs,	the	assumption	is	made	that	the	relative	price	of	industry	output	equals	the	relative	price	of	an	intermediate	input	from	that	industry;	for	imported	intermediate	inputs,	actual	price	data	is	available.	For	labour,	the	available	data	allow	for	a	distinction	between	three	types	of	workers,	namely	high,	medium,	and	low-skilled,	each	with	information	on	their	relative	wage.	The	price	of	capital	input	is	computed	as	the	relative	rental	price	of	capital,	 :	
(5)	
 
ln PctK( )− ln PK( ) = rct +δ c −
!PctI






⎥ ln PctI( )− ln PI( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,	where	 rct 	is	the	required	rate	of	return	on	capital	in	country	c,	 	is	the	average	depreciation	rate,	PctI 	is	the	price	of	investment	goods	and	a	dot	indicates	a	percentage	change	from	one	year	to	 the	next.	The	 first	 term	on	the	right-hand-side	of	equation	(5)	 is	 the	relative	user	cost	of	capital.	




shares.	This	would	be	 the	 cross-country	 counterpart	of	 the	 capital	 services	methodology	as	outlined	in,	for	example,	OECD	(2009)	and	as	applied	for	the	Japan-US	comparison	by	Jorgenson	et	 al.	 (2015).	 This	 is,	 alas,	 an	 area	where	 data	 limitations	 lead	 to	 a	 serious	methodological	shortcoming.	While	data	on	capital	stocks	and	compensation	by	asset	and	industry	is	available	for	a	growing	number	of	countries,	data	availability	is	still	limited	and	would	not	allow	for	a	full	coverage	of	 countries.	The	possible	 implications	of	 this	methodological	 shortcoming	will	be	discussed	later.	Given	the	lack	of	data	on	the	asset	composition	of	industry	capital	input	for	all	countries,	we	use	country-level	average	depreciation	rates	in	equation	(5).	
Aggregation With	measures	of	relative	 industry	output	and	relative	 industry	 input,	 industry	productivity	can	be	 computed	based	on	equation	 (2),	which	 results	 in	productivity	 levels	are	on	a	gross	output	basis.	These	industry	productivity	differences	have	a	magnified	impact	on	the	economy-wide	productivity	since	part	of	the	industry’s	output	is	used	by	other	industries	as	intermediate	inputs.	 Formally,	 Hulten	 (1978)	 showed	 that	 aggregate	 productivity	 (for	 the	 economy	 as	 a	whole	or	for	broad	sectors)	across	N	industries	can	be	computed	using	Domar	(1961)	weights	
w:10	
(6)	 ln Act( )− ln A( ) = 12 wict +wi( )
i=1
N
∑ ln Aic( )− ln Ai( )( ) ,	
where	 	or	the	value	of	gross	output	in	industry	𝑖	divided	by	the	sum	of	value	added	(gross	output	minus	intermediate	inputs)	across	all	N	industries.	
                                                10	The	analysis	in	Domar	(1961)	and	Hulten	(1978)	refers	to	comparisons	of	productivity	over	time;	equation	(7)	adapts	this	to	a	cross-country	setting.	
wic =VicY VicVAi∑
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Productivity growth To	measure	productivity	growth	based	on	a	translog	production	function	(Diewert,	1976;	Caves	et	al.	1982b),	the	change	in	productivity	from	t–1	to	t	(in	a	specific	 industry	in	country	c)	 is	measured	as:		
(7)	 	
This	methodology	is	comparatively	straightforward	as	the	required	data	on	changes	in	volumes	of	 gross	 output,	 intermediate	 inputs,	 labour	 of	 different	 skill	 types	 and	 capital	 are	 (more)	readily	available	from	country	National	Accounts	or	other	sources.	
Data The	 approach	 to	 estimating	 industry	 productivity	 levels	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	requires	data	 on	 the	 input-output	 structure	 of	 each	 country	 over	 time	 and	data	 on	 relative	prices	that	can	be	used	to	infer	industry	output	and	input	relative	prices.	For	information	on	country	input-output	structures,	I	make	use	of	the	World	Input-Output	Database	(WIOD).	This	is	a	source	of	harmonised	input-output	tables,	covering	35	industries	and	40	countries	for	the	period	1995-2011.	Together,	these	countries	represent	two-thirds	of	the	world	population	and	over	80	percent	of	world	GDP	and	span	much	of	the	development	spectrum,	from	India	to	the	United	States.	
The	construction	and	features	of	the	WIOD	are	described	in	detail	in	Timmer	(2012)	and	the	database	is	also	used	in	Timmer,	Los	and	de	Vries	(2015)	to	analyse	the	development	of	global	value	chains	(GVC)	on	competitiveness	and	the	labour	market.	The	WIOD	is	constructed	based	on	national	supply	and	use	tables	(SUTs),	combined	with	time	series	data	from	country	National	Accounts	to	ensure	consistency	with	trends	in	industry	output	and	overall	economic	activity.	Importantly	for	GVC	analysis,	the	SUTs	are	combined	with	data	on	trade	in	goods	and	services.	This	way,	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	the	composition	of	intermediate	inputs	not	only	in	terms	of	what	products	are	used,	but	also	where	 these	products	are	produced	and,	 in	many	cases,	
!ln At( )− ln At−1( ) = ln Yt( )− ln Yt−1( )− 12 v jt − v jt−1( ) ln X jt( )− ln X jt−1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦j=1J∑
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imported	from.	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	though,	this	level	of	detail	is	not	necessary	as	only	a	distinction	between	domestically-produced	and	imported	intermediate	inputs	(from	any	country)	 is	 needed.	 Still,	 the	 fact	 that	much	 effort	 has	 gone	 into	harmonizing	 the	 industrial	classifications	across	countries	makes	the	WIOD	ideally	suited	for	this	type	of	cross-country	analysis.	
However,	a	crucial	difference	with,	for	example,	Timmer	et	al.	(2015)	is	that	the	input-output	data	from	WIOD	is	not	sufficient	for	the	analysis	in	this	chapter	as	these	only	provide	cost	shares	–	 the	 vjc 	from	 equation	 (2)	 –	 and	 nominal	 output	 values	 –	 VcY 	from	 equation	 (3).	 We	additionally	need	information	on	relative	prices	to	allow	for	comparisons	of	output	and	input	quantities	and	thus	relative	productivity	estimates.	 In	part,	 these	are	drawn	from	the	Socio-Economic	Accounts	(SEA)	of	WIOD.	These	provide	information	on	the	labour	compensation	and	number	 of	 hours	worked	 by	workers	 that	 are	 high-skilled,	medium-skilled	 and	 low-skilled	(based	on	their	level	of	education)	as	well	as	on	capital	stocks.11	
For	 computing	 prices	 of	 industry	 output	 (and	 hence	 domestically-produced	 intermediate	inputs),	 relative	prices	 for	 consumption	and	 investment	 and	 relative	prices	 for	 exports	 and	imports	 are	 used	 (cf.	 equation	 (4)).	 Consumption	 and	 investment	 prices	 are	 from	 the	International	Comparison	Program	(ICP),	run	by	the	World	Bank,	and	we	use	the	three	surveys	covering	a	global	sample	of	countries	that	were	done	in	the	1995-2011	period,	namely	for	1996,	2005	and	2011.12	We	use	the	most	detailed	publicly-available	data	from	each	of	these	years	and	
                                                11	Capital	compensation	is	determined	as	value	added	minus	labor	compensation.	Aggregate	compensation	and	employment	data	from	PWT	is	used	to	extrapolate	data	from	the	final	year	covered	in	the	Socio-Economic	Accounts	(2009)	 to	 2011;	 note	 that	 this	 extrapolation	 is	 only	 used	 to	 update	 cost	 shares,	 not	 for	 estimating	 industry	productivity	growth.	
12	See	World	Bank	(2008)	for	the	description	of	the	2005	survey	and	results	and	World	Bank	(2014)	for	the	2011	results.	
 	 13	
map	 consumption	 and	 investment	 categories	 to	 industries.	 Aggregating	 across	 expenditure	categories	 is	done	using	the	CCD	index.	 ICP	prices	are	based	on	surveys	of	purchaser	prices	rather	than	producer	prices,	which	means	that	differences	 in	product	taxes	and	distribution	margins	would	lead	to	a	bias	in	industry	output	prices.	I	therefore	use	tax	and	margin	data	from	WIOD	to	adjust	 the	 ICP	prices.13	For	years	not	covered	by	 ICP	survey	data,	we	use	 industry	deflators	to	interpolate	(for,	say,	2007)	or	extrapolate	(e.g.	1995)	relative	prices,	as	in	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015).	
For	three	of	the	services	industries	–	government,	health	and	education	–	the	ICP	prices	do	not	reflect	the	prices	paid	by	purchasers	of	theses	services,	since	public	provision	or	funding	makes	output	prices	hard	or	even	impossible	to	observe.	Instead,	ICP	aims	to	measure	input	prices,	see	Heston	(2013).	In	our	framework,	this	implies	equal	productivity	levels	across	countries	since	 relative	 ‘output’	 prices	 equal	 relative	 input	 prices.	 These	 industries	 are	 therefore	excluded	when	analysing	productivity	differences	over	time.	Similarly,	the	real	estate	industry	is	 excluded	 as	 (for	 the	most	 part)	 its	 output	 is	 the	 imputed	 rental	 cost	 of	 owner-occupied	housing	 and	 the	 ‘private	 households	 with	 employed	 persons’	 industry	 is	 excluded	 as	 its	dominant	(sometimes	only)	input	is	labour	(as	well	as	incomplete	coverage	across	countries).	The	remaining	set	of	30	industries	will	be	referred	to	as	the	market	economy.	
Relative	prices	of	exports	and	imports	are	from	Feenstra	and	Romalis	(2014),	based	on	quality-adjusted	unit	values.	Quality	differences	are	inferred	using	a	model	of	demand	and	supply	of	quality	as	an	attribute	of	a	traded	good	between	two	countries.	Demand	for	quality	is	deemed	high	 if	observed	demand	 is	high	but	prices	are	not	 low;	 supply	of	quality	 is	deemed	high	 if	supply	 is	 high	 despite	 high	 trade	 costs.	 We	 distinguish	 between	 prices	 of	 imported	intermediates	and	imported	final	goods	using	the	Broad	Economic	Classification	(BEC)	system,	
                                                13	See	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2014)	for	more	details	on	the	mapping	procedure	and	the	adjustment	for	taxes	and	distribution	margins.	
 	 14	
aggregating	over	more	detailed	products	using	the	CCD	index.	Final	good	import	prices	are	used	when	estimating	 industry	output	prices	 (equation	 (4))	 and	 intermediates	 import	prices	 are	used	when	estimating	industry	intermediate	input	prices.	
In	contrast	to	other	industries,	there	is	direct	data	on	producer	prices	in	agriculture,	from	the	Food	 and	 Agricultural	 Organization	 (FAO).	 These	 have	 been	 widely	 used	 in	 studying	productivity	in	agriculture,	typically	based	on	the	relative	prices	estimated	by	Rao	(1993).14	For	this	analysis,	I	collected	prices	and	production	quantities	for	crops	and	livestock	directly	from	FAO	and	aggregated	these	to	overall	agriculture	relative	output	prices	for	each	year	using	the	CCD	index.	
The	relative	price	of	capital	–	estimated	using	equation	(5)	–	requires	data	on	investment	prices,	for	which	ICP	prices	can	be	used	directly.	The	required	rate	of	return	is	taken	as	the	lending	rate,	taken	from	the	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics;	the	depreciation	rates	are	from	PWT	version	 8.0,	which	 provides	 country-level	 average	 depreciation	 rates	 in	 each	 year;	 and	 the	investment	price	change	is	from	WIOD.	One	drawback	is	that	relative	investment	prices	only	cover	fixed	reproducible	assets,	so	omitting	land.	This	omission	can	be	particularly	relevant	for	agriculture	so	I	also	computed	relative	productivity	using	the	procedure	of	Vollrath	(2009).	The	results	 for	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 agricultural	 productivity	 over	 time	 are	 qualitatively	similar	to	those	presented	below.	
Results 
Productivity dispersion To	frame	the	context	of	the	sectoral	analysis,	Figure	1	presents	the	trend	in	market	economy	productivity	dispersion	 across	 the	 set	 of	 40	 countries	 covered	 in	 the	 analysis.	As	discussed	above,	the	market	economy	refers	to	the	aggregate	of	all	industries	except	government,	health	





Aggregate	convergence	is	also	found	if	weighting	is	omitted	(–9	percent).	Furthermore,	the	26	percent	decline	in	Figure	1	is	both	economically	substantial	and,	using	the	T3	test	of	Carree	and	Klomp	 (1997),	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 10	 percent	 level.	 Figure	 1	 also	 shows	 that	 the	finding	of	 convergence	 is	 a	 fairly	 continuous	process	 so	 the	 subsequent	 comparison	will	be	done	by	comparing	the	dispersion	in	2011	to	that	in	1995.	Aggregate	convergence	is	due	in	part	to	rapidly	rising	productivity	levels	in	China	(increasing	from	22	to	34	percent	of	the	US	level)	and	India	(27	to	38	percent).	However,	big	increases	in	relative	productivity	are	also	seen	in	





1995 2000 2005 2010Note:.Productivity.dispersion.is.measured.as.the.standard.deviation.of.log.productivity.levels,.weightedusing.the.share.of.factor.inputs..Market.economy.covers.all.industries.except.government,.health,education,.real.estate.and.households.
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Turkey	(35	to	46	percent)	and	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	where	big	increases	can	be	seen	in	countries	like	Estonia	(35	to	49	percent)	and	Poland	(42	to	54	percent).	
To	 analyse	 the	 sectoral	 pattern	 of	 convergence	 and	 how	 these	 contribute	 to	 aggregate	convergence,	 I	 follow	 a	 fairly	 standard	 split	 into	 major	 sectors,	 distinguishing	 agriculture,	manufacturing,	 market	 services	 (transport,	 distribution,	 communication,	 hotels	 and	restaurants,	finance	and	business	services)	and	other	goods	(mining,	utilities	and	construction).	Table	1	summarises	this	analysis	and	shows	that	productivity	convergence	is	almost	entirely	driven	 by	 convergence	 in	manufacturing,	where	 productivity	 dispersion	 fell	 by	 48	 percent.	Dispersion	in	agriculture	and	other	goods	was	approximately	constant,	while	market	services	shows	an	increase	in	dispersion.	
Table	1,	Productivity	dispersion	in	1995	and	2011	by	main	sectors	
 1995 2011 %	Change Market	economy 0.610 0.449 -26 * Agriculture 0.852 0.827 -3  Manufacturing 1.079 0.565 -48 ** Market	services 0.375 0.419 12  Other	goods 0.360 0.342 -5  
     Market	economy	at	1995	structure 0.624 0.492 -21  Notes:	Table	reports	the	standard	deviation	of	log	productivity	levels,	weighted	using	country	shares	in	the	sample	population.	*	(**)	indicates	that	the	indicated	change	is	significant	at	the	10	(5)	percent	level	according	to	the	T3	test	of	Carree	and	Klomp	(1997). Convergence	analyses	for	OECD	countries	have	typically	shown	that	productivity	in	services	converges	more	rapidly	than	manufacturing	productivity;	this	was	the	main	result	of	Bernard	and	 Jones	(1996)	and	van	Biesebroeck	(2009)	has	similar	 findings.	 In	contrast,	 the	study	of	manufacturing	productivity	for	a	much	broader	set	of	countries	by	Rodrik	(2013)	showed	clear	evidence	of	convergence.	The	results	in	Table	1	suggest	that	the	convergence	of	productivity	in	services	in	OECD	countries	is	specific	to	that	group	of	countries	or	to	the	time	period	rather	
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than	a	more	general	results.16	The	sizeable	productivity	dispersion	in	agriculture	is	consistent	with	the	broader	literature	(e.g.	Caselli,	2005)	and	the	relative	lack	of	convergence	in	this	sector	shows	that	this	large	dispersion	is	a	persistent	factor.	
The	bottom	part	of	the	table	shows	that	structural	change	was	an	important	factor	for	overall	convergence.	The	line	‘Market	economy	at	1995	structure’	shows	how	productivity	dispersion	would	have	changed	if	the	value	added	shares	of	the	30	industries	in	the	analysis	had	remained	at	1995	levels	throughout	the	period	in	each	country.	In	this	counterfactual	case,	changes	in	industry	productivity	 levels	would	still	have	 led	to	convergence	but	much	 less	 than	actually	observed:	a	reduction	in	the	standard	deviation	of	21	rather	than	26	percent.	Structural	change	can	thus	be	said	to	account	for	about	one-fifth	of	aggregate	convergence.		
The	 agricultural	 sector	made	 a	 positive	 contribution	 to	 overall	 convergence	 as	 the	 sector’s	share	of	(nominal)	market	economy	value	added	decreased	from	an	average	of	8.5	percent	in	1995	 to	4.7	percent	 in	2011	and	productivity	dispersion	 in	 the	sector	 is	 larger	 than	 for	 the	market	economy	as	a	whole	throughout	the	period.	The	role	of	the	other	sectors	is	more	mixed:	there	was	a	clear	shift	in	economic	activity	away	from	agriculture	and	manufacturing	(27.8	to	22.9	percent)	and	towards	market	services	(50.1	to	57.4	percent),	but	the	pattern	of	dispersion	in	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	period	relative	to	the	market	economy	makes	the	overall	impact	of	each	sector	harder	to	gauge.	
At	this	point,	is	helpful	to	step	back	and	consider	how	the	methodological	limitations	regarding	the	measurement	of	industry	output	prices	and	capital	input	prices	that	were	detailed	in	the	previous	 could	 affect	 these	 results.	 Regarding	 the	 industry	 output	 prices,	 I	 compared	 my	detailed	Japan-US	industry	output	prices	for	2005	to	those	reported	in	Nomura	and	Miyagawa	(2015,	Table	3)	and	used	in	Jorgenson	et	al.	(2015).	On	an	encouraging	note,	the	two	sets	of	
                                                16	See	e.g.	van	Ark,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2008)	on	diverging	productivity	growth	patterns	in	market	services	across	Europe	and	the	US	after	1995.	
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industry	output	prices	are	positively	correlated,	but	with	a	correlation	of	0.54	there	are	also	notable	differences.	Some	of	those	differences	will	cancel	out,	as	there	are	industries	where	I	find	 higher	 relative	 prices	 and	 those	 where	 I	 find	 lower	 relative	 prices	 than	 Nomura	 and	Miyagawa	 (2015).	 But	 overall,	my	 estimates	 seem	 to	 overestimate	 relative	 industry	 output	pries	compared	to	Nomura	and	Miyagawa	(2015),	which	would,	ceteris	paribus,	lead	to	lower	relative	 productivity	 levels	 in	 Japan	 relative	 to	 the	 US	 in	 the	 year	 2005.	 This	 degree	 of	overestimation	of	output	prices	seems	to	be	larger	in	market	services	than	in	manufacturing.	
It	is	harder	to	draw	broader	lessons	from	this	comparison	for	my	results	regarding	productivity	convergence.	For	one,	there	is	no	clear	pattern	or	systematic	reason	for	the	differences	between	the	two	sets	of	industry	output	prices,	so	generalizing	the	difference	for	Japan-US	in	2005	to	other	countries	and	years	would	not	be	well-grounded.	More	generally,	 for	the	convergence	results	 to	 be	 affected,	 the	degree	 of	 overestimation	of	my	 estimated	 industry	 output	 prices	compared	with	the	‘true’	industry	output	prices	would	have	to	be	a)	larger	in	manufacturing	than	in	other	sectors,	b)	be	larger	in	lower-income	economies,	and	c)	decrease	over	time.	If	all	these	 conditions	were	met,	 the	productivity	 dispersion	 in	manufacturing	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	period	would	have	been	overestimated	compared	to	later	years	and	compared	to	other	sectors,	potentially	overturning	the	‘faster	convergence	in	manufacturing’	result.	It	is	not	impossible	for	these	conditions	to	be	met,	but	there	is	no	evidence	pointing	in	this	direction.	
It	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 a	 more	 informed	 assessment	 about	 the	 potential	 bias	 in	 relative	productivity	estimates	from	missing	data	on	the	asset	composition	of	industry	capital	stocks	based	 on	 economy-wide	 asset	 composition.	 The	 depreciation	 rate	 of	 structures	 is	 low	compared	to	depreciation	rates	for	equipment	–	around	a	2	percent	annual	geometric	rate	for	structures,	 compared	 to	 10-35	 percent	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	 equipment.	 As	 a	 result,	structures	will	tend	to	account	for	a	relatively	large	share	of	the	value	of	the	capital	stock.	This	is	 confirmed	 when	 looking	 at	 economy-wide	 (weighted)	 average	 depreciation	 rates	 –	 as	reported	in	the	Penn	World	Table	(Feenstra	et	al.	2015)	–	of,	on	average,	4	percent.	Moving	
 	 19	
from	a	homogenous	capital	stock	to	a	(more	appropriate)	capital	services	measure	will	give	a	lower	weight	to	structures,	since	the	user	cost	of	capital	increases	with	the	asset	depreciation	rate	(equation	(5)).	We	also	know	that	relative	investment	prices	of	equipment	tend	to	differ	less	across	countries	than	relative	prices	of	structures	(see	e.g.	Hsieh	and	Klenow,	2007).	This	is	because	equipment	is	largely	imported,	while	investment	in	structures	relies	heavily	on	local	(labor)	input.	As	a	result	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect,	the	relative	price	of	structures	will	be	lower	 in	 lower-income	countries.	Compared	to	the	capital	 input	prices	used	 in	this	analysis,	lower-income	 countries	 would	 tend	 to	 have	 higher	 capital	 services	 prices	 and	 thus	 higher	productivity	levels.	This	would	mean	that	productivity	dispersion	is	overstated	in	my	results,	a	prediction	borne	out	by	the	results	of	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2009,	Table	4).	In	their	sample	of	mostly	high-income	countries,	productivity	dispersion	is	approximately	15	percent	lower	when	appropriately	accounting	for	the	asset	composition	of	industry	capital	stocks.	As	lower-income	countries	grow	richer,	this	degree	of	overstatement	should	decrease.	In	other	words,	it	seems	likely	that	some	of	the	convergence	found	in	my	data	is	due	to	mismeasured	capital	input	prices.	It	is	not	clear,	though,	that	this	problem	would	be	more	severe	in	manufacturing	than	in	other	sectors,	though.	





In	this	equation,	productivity	growth	for	industry	𝑖	in	country	c	from	year	𝑡– 1	to	year	t	(based	on	equation	(7))	is	explained	using	the	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier	–	the	productivity	level	in	country	c	relative	to	the	productivity	level	of	the	country	with	the	highest	productivity	level	 –	 (computed	based	on	equation	 (2))	 at	𝑡– 1,	 explanatory	variable	X	 and	an	 interaction	between	X	 and	 the	 proximity	 to	 the	 productivity	 frontier.	 In	 addition,	 a	 full	 set	 of	 country-industry	dummies	and	year	dummies	is	included.	We	would	expect	a	negative	coefficient	for	𝛽1,	since	a	greater	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier	implies	fewer	opportunities	to	achieve	productivity	growth	by	imitating	frontier	technologies.		
The	main	 interest	 is	 in	coefficient	𝛽3.	 If	 this	coefficient	 is	significantly	different	 from	zero,	 it	implies	that	variable	X	has	a	different	effect	on	productivity	growth	depending	on	the	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier.	So,	for	example,	Griffith	et	al.	(2004)	find	that	in	countries	that	are	closer	 to	 the	 frontier,	 research	 and	 development	 (R&D)	 spending	 contributes	 less	 to	productivity	 growth,	 indicating	 that	 R&D	 spending	 helps	 both	 innovation	 (pushing	 out	 the	frontier)	and	imitation	(catching	up	to	the	frontier).	
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discusses,	imports	of	more	advanced	inputs	are	an	important	source	of	technology	transfer,	so	these	imports	would	be	expected	to	have	a	greater	impact	on	productivity	growth	for	industries	that	are	farther	from	the	productivity	frontier.	Note	that	‘high-tech’	uses	the	OECD	definition	of	high	and	medium-high	 technology	 industries.	The	 third	variable	 is	R&D,	which	according	 to	Griffith	et	al.	(2004)	would	have	a	greater	impact	in	industries	farther	from	the	productivity	frontier	 since	R&D	helps	both	 innovation	and	 imitation.	The	 fourth	variable	 is	FDI,	which	–	again	–	following	Keller	(2004)	could	be	a	source	of	foreign	technology	and	thus	help		growth	in	industries	more	distant	from	the	frontier.	The	final	variable	is	the	Lerner	index,	or	price-cost	margin,	where	a	higher	Lerner	index	implies	less	intensive	competition.	As	discussed	in	Aghion	et	al.	 (2014),	 fiercer	competition	would	be	particularly	beneficial	 for	 industries	close	 to	 the	frontier	as	those	industries	rely	more	on	innovation	for	growth	and	(unless	competition	turns	too	cut-throat)	competition	is	beneficial	for	growth.	
Table	2,	Potential	determinants	of	productivity	growth	and	determinants	Variable Definition Source High-skilled The	share	of	university-educated	workers	in	total	hours	worked WIOD,	SEA High-tech	M Industry	imports	of	intermediate	inputs	of	chemicals,	machinery,	electronics	&	transport	equipment	as	a	share	of	industry	gross	output WIOD R&D Business	enterprise	research	and	development	expenditure	as	a	share	of	industry	gross	output OECD,	Eurostat FDI Stock	of	inward	foreign	direct	investment	as	a	share	of	gross	output OECD,	Eurostat Lerner Ratio	of	price	over	marginal	cost INDICSER	database Note:	WIOD,	see	www.wiod.org;	INDICSER,	see	www.indicser.com.	
Given	these	predictions,	equation	(8)	can	be	estimated	for	each	of	the	variables	of	interest.	As	indicated	in	the	equation,	the	regressions	include	dummies	for	each	country/industry	pair	to	account	 for	unobserved	heterogeneity	and	year	dummies	 to	account	 for	common	shocks.	 In	addition,	I	use	two	further	lags	of	the	explanatory	variables	(so	at	𝑡– 2	and	𝑡– 3)	as	instruments	in	a	two-step	GMM	procedure	to	reduce	endogeneity	concerns.	Though	more	truly	exogenous	
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variables,	such	as	the	introduction	of	the	European	Single	Market	Program	exploited	by	Griffith	et	al.	(2010),	would	be	preferable,	these	are	typically	hard	to	find.	Finally,	standard	errors	are	clustered	by	country-industry	pair	to	allow	for	correlation	of	errors	within	each	cross-section.	
Table	3	shows	the	results	of	the	analysis.	The	first	row	shows	industries	that	are	closer	to	the	productivity	frontier	grow	less	rapidly,	though	in	the	more	limited	samples	for	R&D	(mostly	manufacturing	 and	 omitting	 some	 emerging	 economies)	 and	 FDI	 (omitting	 some	 emerging	economies)	 these	 are	 less	 significant.	 In	 the	 final	 column,	 the	 coefficient	 is	 not	 significantly	different	from	zero	and	the	sample	covers	only	8	European	economies	after	2002.	Turning	to	the	 explanatory	 variables,	 the	 table	 shows	 that	 high-tech	 imports,	 R&D	 and	 FDI	 have	 a	significant	positive	effect	on	productivity	growth,	but	the	effect	does	not	vary	depending	on	the	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier.	In	fact,	none	of	the	interaction	coefficients	is	significantly	different	 from	zero,	 thus	 failing	 to	 contribute	 to	our	understanding	of	why	 some	 industries	show	faster	convergence	than	others.	
Table	3,	Explaining	productivity	growth	and	convergence	– regression	results	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 High-skilled High-tech	M R&D FDI Lerner Proximity	to	the	frontier –0.0279*** –0.0334*** –0.0174* –0.0185* 0.0369 
 (0.00765) (0.00755) (0.00957) (0.0108) (0.0310) Explanatory	variable –0.00123 0.162*** 0.852*** 0.00259** -0.101 
 (0.0386) (0.0582) (0.329) (0.00103) (0.201) Interaction –0.0276 0.0663 –0.478 –0.00283 –0.279 
 (0.0338) (0.0430) (0.395) (0.00254) (0.216) 
      Observations 13435 13435 5676 4398 1955 Overid.	restrictions 0.727 0.404 0.129 0.197 0.0482 Notes:	each	column	represents	a	separate	regression	explaining	productivity	growth	using	the	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier,	the	explanatory	variable	that	is	identified	in	the	column	header	and	an	interaction	between	the	proximity	to	the	frontier	and	the	explanatory	variable,	see	also	equation	(8)	for	the	specification	and	Table	2	for	 definitions	 of	 the	 explanatory	 variables.	 Each	 regression	 includes	 country/industry	 dummies	 and	 year	dummies	 and	 two	 lagged	 values	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	 used	 as	 instruments	 in	 a	 two-step	 GMM	procedure.	Standard	errors,	clustered	by	country/industry	pair,	are	in	parentheses.	‘Overid.	restrictions’	gives	the	p-value	of	the	Hansen	J	statistic	on	the	overidentifying	restrictions	of	all	instruments.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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If	the	results	had	shown	that	a	particular	variable	had	a	stronger	effect	on	productivity	growth	for	industries	farther	from	the	frontier,	this	would	have	been	clear	evidence	that	this	variable	enhances	the	rate	of	convergence.	A	more	indirect	way	would	be	if	that	variable	has	a	direct	effect	on	productivity	growth	and	takes	on	higher	values	in	industries	farther	from	the	frontier.	The	high-tech	import	share	is	negatively	correlated	with	the	proximity	to	the	frontier	but	at	–0.04,	the	relationship	is	weak.	In	contrast,	R&D	intensity	is	positively	correlated	with	proximity	to	the	frontier	and,	at	0.11,	this	relationship	is	somewhat	stronger.	So,	if	anything,	the	high-tech	import	 share	 is	a	 force	of	 convergence,	while	R&D	would	 lead	 to	divergence.	However,	 it	 is	unclear	whether	these	correlations	have	systematic	drivers	or	are	a	coincidence.	
To	 establish	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 results	 in	 Table	 3,	 I	 have	 considered	 that	 the	 industry	proximity	to	the	frontier	could	be	measured	with	error	and	that,	due	to	the	persistence	in	this	variable,	this	is	not	adequately	addressed	by	using	lagged	values	of	industry	proximity.	In	the	first	sensitivity	analysis,	 I	 therefore	use	two	 lagged	values	of	 the	aggregate	proximity	to	 the	productivity	frontier	as	 instruments	for	 industry	proximity	to	the	frontier.	These	are	clearly	weaker	 instruments,	 as	 indicated	by	 first-stage	 F-statistics	 and	 the	 pattern	 of	 results	 is	 the	same.	
In	 the	 second	 sensitivity	 analysis,	 I	 run	 the	 regressions	 for	 major	 sectors,	 i.e.	 subsets	 of	industries	rather	than	all	industries	together.	Specifically,	I	run	regressions	for	manufacturing,	market	 services	 and	 other	 goods	 (including	 agriculture,	 as	 well	 as	 mining,	 utilities	 and	construction).	This	provides	some	evidence	that	the	impact	of	FDI	varies	with	proximity	to	the	frontier,	but	is	unclear	why	FDI	would	have	a	stronger	effect	on	productivity	growth	when	an	industry	is	close	to	the	productivity	frontier	in	manufacturing	and	other	goods	production,	but	a	weaker	effect	in	market	services.	
It	 is,	 again,	 useful	 to	 consider	 how	 the	measurement	 of	 relative	 prices	may	 influence	 these	results.	Given	the	regression	context	of	this	analysis,	 it	 is	helpful	to	view	this	as	an	error-in-
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variables	 problem:	 I	measure	 ‘true’	 productivity	 growth	 and	 proximity	 to	 the	 frontier	with	error.	 Inklaar,	 Timmer	 and	 van	 Ark	 (2008)	 consider	 alternative	 measures	 of	 industry	productivity	growth	and	comparative	levels,	based	on	EU	KLEMS	data,	and	I	can	compare	their	measures	that	do	not	account	for	differences	and	changes	in	asset	composition	with	those	that	do.	The	correlation	between	these	two	sets	of	measures	is	0.99	for	both	productivity	growth	and	comparative	levels.	Their	sample	of	countries	is	more	limited,	covering	mostly	high-income	countries,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	 the	measurement	 error	 from	 not	accounting	 for	 asset	 composition	 differences	 and	 changes	 would	 be	 notably	 different	 in	 a	broader	 sample	of	 countries.	 In	other	words,	 there	 is	 little	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	using	 the	methodologically	more	appropriate	capital	services	methodology	would	lead	to	substantively	different	regression	results.	
Discussion and conclusions In	this	paper,	 I	have	analysed	productivity	convergence	from	an	 industry	perspective	 for	an	unusually	 detailed	 and	 broad	 set	 of	 countries	 and	 industries:	 40	 economies	 across	 the	development	spectrum	and	30	industries	covering	the	market	economy	(i.e.	excluding	those	industries	where	no	sensible	productivity	measures	could	be	computed).	The	first	aim	was	to	document	the	sectoral	sources	of	aggregate	convergence.	Compared	with	the	existing	single-sector	studies	or	OECD-sample	studies,	this	analysis	offers	much	more	scope	for	generalizable	results.	
This	analysis	showed	how	only	the	manufacturing	sector	contributed	to	the	rapid	aggregate	convergence.	This	suggests	that	some	of	the	evidence	showing	(faster)	convergence	in	services	in	OECD	countries	does	not	generalise	to	the	current	broader	set	of	countries	and	more	recent	period.	 Conversely,	 the	 results	 are	 more	 in	 line	 with	 the	 findings	 of	 Rodrik	 (2013)	 of	(unconditional)	convergence	of	manufacturing	productivity.	
 	 25	
The	 second	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 was	 to	 establish	 why	 some	 industries	 show	 more	 rapid	convergence	 than	 others	 by	 testing	whether	 a	 variety	 of	 variables	 have	 a	 greater	 effect	 on	productivity	growth	in	industries	that	are	more	distant	from	the	productivity	frontier.	While	some	variables	–	R&D,	FDI	and	high-tech	imports	intensity	–	were	indeed	significantly	related	to	 productivity	 growth,	 others	 –	 high-skilled	 workers	 and	 competition	 –	 were	 not.	 More	importantly,	none	of	the	variables	showed	a	significantly	different	effect	on	productivity	growth	depending	on	the	proximity	to	the	productivity	frontier.	
So	where	to	look	to	better	understand	productivity	convergence?	In	a	volume	such	as	this,	a	first	point	for	discussion	is	surely	more	appropriate	data.	As	I	have	discussed	in	some	detail,	the	 lack	 of	 data	 on	 the	 asset	 composition	 of	 industry	 capital	 stocks	 means	 that	 I	 cannot	implement	the	full	KLEMS	methodology	with	a	capital	services	approach.	An	implication	for	the	convergence	analysis	of	this	measurement	shortcoming	is	that	I	likely	overestimate	the	degree	of	 convergence.	 Furthermore,	 the	 industry	 output	 price	 comparison	 is	 based	 on	 imperfect	source	 material,	 which	 seems	 to	 lead	 to	 notably	 difference	 relative	 prices	 than	 the	 more	extensive	price	information	used	by	Jorgenson	et	al.	(2015)	for	the	Japan-US	2005	comparison.	This	is	a	source	of	uncertainty,	as	the	differences	for	one	country	pair	in	one	year	are	hard	to	generalize.	 So	 especially	 for	 measuring	 the	 degree	 of	 productivity	 convergence,	 more	appropriate	data	on	industry	output	and	capital	prices	are	sorely	needed.	In	the	context	of	the	regression	results,	though,	there	is	likely	less	impact	of	the	lack	of	a	capital	services	approach	in	estimating	productivity	growth	and	comparative	levels,	as	data	based	on	EU	KLEMS	show	very	high	correlations	between	growth	and	comparative	 level	measures	 that	do	and	do	not	apply	the	capital	services	methodology.	
There	 are	 other	 concerns	 about	 the	 regressions	 analysis,	 though.	 It	 could	 be	 that	 the	specification	chosen	here	is	not	appropriate;	for	instance	it	could	be	that	learning	takes	place	in	 proportion	 to	 actual	 trade	 or	 investment	 between	 specific	 countries	 (e.g.	 Keller,	 2004)	instead	 of	 a	 common	 rate	 of	 learning	 from	 the	 frontier	 industry.	 Beyond	 that,	 a	 first	 set	 of		
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alternative	candidates	are	sector-	or	industry-specific	regulations,	such	as	import	tariffs	and	other	 trade	 restrictions	 (e.g.	 Lileeva	 and	 Trefler,	 2010)	 or	 barriers	 to	 entry	 (Nicoletti	 and	Scarpetta,	2003).	Other	candidates	are	macro	variables	whose	effects	differ	across	industries,	such	as	 financial	development	(Rajan	and	Zingales,	1998),	 infrastructure	(Fernald,	1999)	or	labour	market	institutions	(Bassanini,	Nunziata	and	Venn,	2009).	A	third	possibility	would	be	that	a	variable	considered	here	has	a	different	effect	depending	on	some	other	variable	that	is	related	to,	but	not	perfectly	correlated	with	(industry)	productivity.	For	example,	Alfaro	et	al.	(2010)	 find	 that	 FDI	 has	 a	 larger	 effect	 on	 productivity	 in	 countries	with	 a	 greater	 level	 of	financial	development.	
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